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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RANDY L. TIPPETS, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 20070246-CA 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT : 
OF COMMERCE, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Tippets failed to marshal the evidence to support his challenge to the 
administrative findings of fact in both his administrative appeal and before this Court. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. The Department of Commerce (Department) 
accepted the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing's (Division) findings of 
fact because the petitioner failed in his duty to marshal the evidence that supported those 
findings. R. 6-7. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision of the Department should be reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. It is within the discretion of a reviewing court to determine what 
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remedy to impose upon a party that fails in its duty to marshal the evidence. Martinez v. 
Media/PavmasterJPlus, 2007 UT 42,1fl[20-21, 164 P.3d 384. That same discretion should 
be applied to the Department where it was following its regulation imposing the duty of 
marshaling the evidence upon a party filing an administrative appeal. 
2. Petitioner cannot raise new evidence and arguments that were not presented in 
the original administrative proceeding before the Division. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. The Department rejected the petitioner's efforts 
to raise these new matters on administrative appeal. R. 14-15. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The determination that issues were not adequately 
raised in the administrative proceeding is a conclusion of law and is reviewed for 
correction of error. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
3. Counsel for the Division's mistake in saying methamphetamines instead of 
amphetamines during opening statement (Tr. Vol. I at 12) did not substantially prejudice 
the petitioner. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was considered and rejected by the 
Deparment. R. 11 n.5. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW:A court can grant relief from agency action only on a 
showing the petitioner has suffered substantial prejudice. Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(4) 
(West 2004). This "substantial prejudice" requirement has been equated with "harmful 
error" Morton Int'L Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 58L 584 (Utah 1991) 
(superseded on other grounds by Utah Code Ann. §59-l-610(l)(b) (West 2004)). 
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4. Petitioner was not prejudiced by the limited discussion of his expunged 
criminal record. The Administrative Law Judge upheld petitioner's objection to this 
evidence and the Division's decision was not based upon the expunged record. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was considered and rejected by the 
Department. R. 11-14. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An agency's interpretation of general questions of 
law is reviewed for correctness. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil. Gas and Mining, 
2001 UT 112,1|18, 38 P.3d 291. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 27, 2004, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action against Randy 
Tippets. R. 120-37. The Notice alleged four counts of misconduct on the part of the 
petitioner. R. 127-28. A formal hearing was held before the Division and its State Board 
of Pharmacy on February 28, 2006 and March 1, 2006. Tr. Vol I and II. 
The Division's Administrative Law Judge entered his findings of fact conclusions 
of law and recommended order on May 24, 2006. The Division's decision only found the 
second and third counts of misconduct to be supported by the evidence. The Division 
found that these findings of misconduct merited the revocation of both petitioner's license 
to practice as a pharmacist and his license to dispense controlled substances. R. 61-72. 
The Division entered its order adopting the ALJ's recommended order that same day. R. 
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60. Petitioner sought agency review of the Division's order on June 23, 2006. R. 59. On 
administrative appeal, the Department upheld the Division's decision in its findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order on review of February 20, 2007. R. 1-17. Petitioner's 
writ of review was filed with this Court on March 19, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are taken from the Department's findings of fact. R. 2-3. 
Tippets was a pharmacist licensed to practice in the State of Utah who was also 
licensed to dispense controlled substances. His license to dispense controlled substances 
was suspended on October 27, 1988, pending further order of the Division. On January 
31, 1989, Tippets' licenses to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled 
substances were suspended for six months pursuant to a disciplinary action by the 
Division, and the petitioner was placed on probation for a period of five years. R. 2, ^flb. 
The conditions and terms of Tippets' probation were modified on February 10, 
1992 and his licenses were reinstated in full on March 23, 1994. R. 2, ^ }lc. 
During October, 2003, petitioner became employed by Dan's Pharmacy. After 
completing an evening shift on October 22, 2003, Tippets remained in the pharmacy until 
the next morning. He was discovered by his supervisor, sitting in the back office with a 
fan blowing on him. Dan's Pharmacy conducted a controlled substance audit on October 
23, 2003, subsequently filing a theft and loss report for Alprazolam, Phentermine, and 
Methylphenidate with the DEA. It also suspended petitioner's employment. R. 3, |^lf. 
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Petitioner's urine drug test conducted on October 24, 2003 revealed the presence 
of amphetamines for which he had no lawful prescription. R. 3, fig. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In his administrative appeal, petitioner failed to marshal the evidence that 
supported the Division's findings of fact. This failure permitted the Department, in its 
discretion, to accept the Division's findings as conclusive. The Department's decision 
was not an abuse of discretion. Indeed, petitioner has failed to marsh; evidence that 
supports the administrative findings of fact in his brief to this Court. The Department's 
factual findings should therefore be upheld on appeal. 
It was petitioner's duty to raise all of his claims and present all of his evidence in 
the formal hearing before the Division. Any issues not presented there were waived. The 
Department did not err in its refusal to consider new issues and evidence that was not 
raised before the Division. 
Petitioner has failed to show how a single misstatement by counsel for the 
Division in his opening statement prejudiced the petitioner. The use of the word 
methamphetamine, when all knew that the correct word was amphetamine, was harmless 
error. Evidence of the petitioner's expunged criminal record was not accepted by the 
ALJ, even though the applicable statute permits the Division to use such evidence. The 
mere mention of the evidence, where it was not relied upon by the Division in reaching its 
decision, did not deny any right of the petitioner. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. TIPPETS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT 
SUPPORTED THE CHALLENGED FINDINGS OF FACT BOTH 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT AND BEFORE THIS COURT 
A party challenging administrative findings of fact has a duty to marshal the 
evidence that supports those findings. 
Furthermore, when challenging an agency action as not based upon 
substantial evidence, appellants have a duty to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the 
[Board's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Road Runner Oil. Inc. v. Bd. of Oil Gas and Mining. 2003 UT App 275,1(10, 76 P.3d 
692 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Covey v. Covey. 2003 
UT App 380,1J27, 80 P.3d 553 ("In order to successfully challenge the trial court's 
findings of fact, Almon must first marshal all the evidence in support of the findingfs] and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding[s] even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.") (internal quotations 
omitted). 
The Department, by has regulation established this same duty on the part of a party 
challenging a finding of fact made by the Division. 
If a party challenges a finding of fact in the order subject to review, 
the party must demonstrate, based on the entire record, that the finding is 
not supported by substantial evidence. A party challenging the facts bears 
the burden to marshal or gather all of the evidence in support of a finding 
and to show that despite such evidence, the finding is not supported by 
substantial evidence. The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the 
executive director to accept a division's findings of fact as conclusive. 
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Utah Admin. Code Rl 51 -46b- 12(3)(c). 
Such a regulation has the effect of law. Utah Code Ann. 63-46a-3.5(2) (West 
2004) ("An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with the 
requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law.15). The discretion 
given to the executive director of the Department is the same discretion given to appellate 
courts to determine what remedy to impose where a party fails to meet his duty to marshal 
the evidence. Martinez. 2007 UT 4 il 1flJ20-2l. 
A review of the petitioner's pleadings before the Department shows that he did not 
meet his burden to marshal the evidence. R. 18-32, 47-49, 59. Nor has the petitioner 
marshaled the evidence that supports the administrative findings of fact in I lis brie1 f^ore 
this Court. Instead he cites to the evidence that he feels supports his claims and 
disregards all other evidence. Brief of the Appellant at 9-11. 
The Department did not abuse its discretion when it ruled tllat tlc Division's 
findings of fact were conclusive where the petitioner failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings. This decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
II. THE DEPARTMENT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CONSU I IN! 
ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE NOT RAISED BEFORE THE 
DIVISION 
Only after the Division's order had been entered did petitioner seek to raise certain 
new arguments and evidence. On administrative appeal to the Department, he sought to 
present evidence of a Brazilian diet drug that might have explained the results of his drug 
test. He also sought to claim for the first time that the agency action against him was 
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retaliatory in nature. R. 14. The Department correctly refused to consider this new 
argument or this new evidence. 
The Executive Director applies the same standards for agency review 
as those used for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah 
Admin. Code Rl 51-46b-12(7). "The appellate court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b~16(4) (emphasis added). Moreover, the record on appeal may be 
supplemented only "because of an omission or exclusion, or a dispute as to 
the accuracy of reporting, and not to introduce new material into the record. 
State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228,1f2, 75 P.3d 923, citing Olson v. Park-
Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis 
added). 
R. 14. 
The Department's regulation relied upon by the Executive Director has the force of 
law. Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-3.5(2) (West 2004). The Department correctly applied the 
law in refusing to consider the new material that petitioner sought to raise in his 
administrative appeal. The same is true of the new issues petitioner sought to raise. 
[A] party seeking review of agency action must raise an issue before that 
agency to preserve the issue for further review. It is well settled that 
"persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies 'may not, by 
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass 
them, and call upon the courts to determine matters properly determinable 
originally by such agencies/ " 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
The Department's review of the Division's Order uses, by regulation, the same 
standards that apply on judicial review of the Department's final agency order. Petitioner 
was required to present all of his evidence and claims before the Division. He could not 
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by-pass that hearing and seek to raise new claims or evidence before the Department or 
before this Court. The Department correctly rejected his efforts to appeal from the 
Division's decision based on materials not part of the agency record. This decision 
should be affirmed on appeal. 
III. I HE MISTAKEN USE OF THE WORD METHAMPHETAMINE 
IS NOT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL 
Petitioner asks this Court to reverse the administrative decision based on a single 
slip of the tongue. In his opening statement, counsel for the Division stated that Tippets' 
drug test came back positive for methamphetamine instead of for amphetamine. Tr. Vol. 
I at 12. Such a misstatement does not rise to the level of reversible error. A court can 
grant relief from agency action only on a showing the petitioner has suffered substantial 
prejudice. Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(4) (West 2004). This "substantial prejudice" 
requirement has been equated with "harmful error." Morton Int'K Inc. v. State Tax 
Gommln, 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991) (superseded on other grounds by Utah Code 
Ann. §59-l-610(l)(b) (West 2004)) ( "[A]n error will be harmless if it is 'sufficiently 
inconsequential that... there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings.5"). 
Tippets has not claimed that the agency action against him was based on the 
erroneous belief that he had tested positive for methamphetamine instead of for 
amphetamine. Both the Division and the Department correctly held that the positive test 
results were for amphetamine. R. 3, 66. The Department did not err in finding that 
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counsel's mistake was at best harmless error. R. 11 n.5. No substantial prejudice was 
shown by the petitioner and the Department's decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
IV. PETITIONER WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE LIMITED 
DISCUSSION OF HIS EXPUNGED CRIMINAL RECORD 
In testifying concerning the petitioner's disciplinary record, a Division investigator 
mentioned that there was no further information available concerning Tippets' 1988 
disciplinary action because the related criminal record had been expunged. Tr. Vol. I at 
168. Petitioner asked that his expunged records not be unsealed and made available to the 
Board. Tr. Vol. I at 186-87. At the beginning of the second day of the hearing, the ALJ 
ruled that the expunged records would not be permitted in evidence. Tr. Vol. II at 262. 
He also instructed the Board that it was not to speculate as to the reason that the 
expungement existed and the members of the Board were not to consider the 
expungement in considering this matter. Tr. Vol. II at 262-63. "There won't be any 
further testimony offered in this case as to that matter because it's simply not properly 
before the Board and no further inquiries about it would be appropriate." Tr. Vol. II at 
263. 
Towards the conclusion of the hearing the ALJ again reminded the participants 
that the expunged material was not before the Board and "the contents of the documents 
can neither be assumed to be favorable or disfavorable to either party in this proceeding." 
Tr. Vol. II at 492. The Division's decision does not mention the expungement. The 
Department did not rely upon the expungement in reaching its decision. Instead, the 
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Department reviewed the mentions of the expungement before the Division and 
determined that they constituted harmless error. R. 11-14. 
The Division had the right to rely on the expunged records if it so desired. By 
statute the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing is one of five state 
agencies that have the right to obtain expunged records without a court order. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-18-15(2) (West 2004). The only restriction on the Division's use of expunged 
records is that it must give the subject of the records a reasonable opportunity U» 
challenge and explain the information contained therein and to challenge its relevancy to 
the proceeding before the Division. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-15(4) (West 2004). No right 
of the petitioner would have been violated by the admission of evidence of his expunged 
criminal record. 
Nor was any right violated by the Division's decision not to use such evidence. 
The Division's decision does not rely on this evidence. It was excluded. The Board was 
instructed on several occasions not to consider or speculate concerning the expunged 
criminal record. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the limited comment on this topic affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-l 6(4) (West 2004) (petitioner must show that he has been 
substantially prejudiced by the agency's alleged error). This is especially so where the 
Department did not rely upon this information in any manner in its review of the 
Division's decision. 
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Petitioner's expunged criminal record was not admitted into evidence. The Board 
was instructed to not consider it in any manner. The Department correctly ruled that any 
error involved was harmless and that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, respondent asks this Court to affirm the 
Department's decision upholding the revocation of the petitioner's licenses. 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Respondent-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in 
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been decided by this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court in published opinions, are not such that oral argument 
or a published opinion is necessary, though respondents desire to participate in oral 
argument if such is held by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this JJ day of August, 2007. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney Genera] 
Attorney for Respondent - Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent - Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this dJ day of August, 
2007: 
Randy L. Tippets 
5123 South 550 West 




DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-3.5 (West 2004) Rules having the effect of law. 
(1) An agency's written statement is a rule if it conforms to the definition of a rule under 
Section 63-46a-2, but the written statement is not enforceable unless it is made as a rule 
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(2) An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with the 
requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-15 (West 2004) Retention of expunged records — Agencies. 
(1) The division shall keep, index, and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions. 
(2) Employees of the division may not divulge any information contained in its index to 
any person or agency without a court order, except to the following: 
(a) the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(b) the Peace Officer Standards and Training; 
(c) federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law; 
(d) the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing; and 
(e) the State Office of Education. 
(3) The division may also use the information in its index for the purpose of establishing 
good character for issuance of a concealed firearm permit as provided in Section 53-5-704. 
(4) A person whose records are released under Subsection (2) shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity by the recipient agency to challenge and explain any information in the 
records and to challenge the relevancy of that information before a final determination is 
made by the agency. 
(5) A court may permit inspection or release of an expunged record only upon petition by 
the person who is the subject of the record and only to the persons named in the petition. 
(6) (a) For judicial sentencing, a court may order any records sealed under this section to 
be opened and admitted into evidence. 
(b) The records are confidential and are available for inspection only by the court, parties, 
counsel for the parties, and any other person who is authorized by the court to inspect them. 
(c) At the end of the action or proceeding, the court shall order the records sealed again. 
(7) Records released under this section are classified as protected under Section 63-2-304 
and are accessible only as provided under Title 63, Chapter 2, Part 2, Access to Records. 
Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12(3) & (7). Agency Review. 
(3) Content of a Request for Agency Review - Transcript of Hearing - Service. 
(a) The content of a request for agency review shall be in accordance with 
Subsection 63-46b- 12(l)(b). The request for agency review shall include a copy 
of the order that is the subject of the request, 
(b) A party requesting agency review shall set forth any factual or legal basis 
in support of that request, including adequate supporting arguments and citation 
to appropriate legal authority and to the relevant portions of the record 
developed during the adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) If a party challenges a finding of fact in the order subject to review, the 
party must demonstrate, based on the entire record, that the finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence. A party challenging the facts bears the 
burden to marshal or gather all of the evidence in support of a finding and to 
show that despite such evidence, the finding is not supported by substantial 
evidence. The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the executive director 
to accept a division's findings of fact as conclusive. A party challenging a 
legal conclusion must support the argument with citation to any relevant 
authority and also cite to those portions of the record that are relevant to 
that issue. 
(d) If the grounds for agency review include any challenge to a determination of 
fact or conclusion of law as unsupported by or contrary to the evidence, the 
party seeking agency review shall order and cause a transcript of the record 
relevant to such finding or conclusion to be prepared. When a request for agency 
review is filed under such circumstances, the party seeking review shall certify 
that a transcript has been ordered and shall notify the department when the 
transcript will be available for filing with the department. The party seeking 
agency review shall bear the cost of the transcript. 
(e) A party seeking agency review shall, in the manner described in R151-46b-8, 
file and serve upon all other parties copies of correspondence, pleadings, and 
other submissions. If an attorney enters an appearance on behalf of a party, 
service shall thereafter be made upon that attorney, instead of directly to the 
party. 
(f) Failure to comply with this rule may result in dismissal of the request for 
agency review. 
(7) Standard of Review. 
The standards for agency review correspond to the standards for judicial review 




BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERC 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
Randy T. Tippets, 
PETITIONER 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
DOPL 
INTRODUCTION 
Randy T. Tippets ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before the 
Department of Commerce ("Department"), challenging an adverse decision from the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division"). 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63-46b-12, and Utah Administrative Code, R151-46b-12. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether the Petitioner properly challenged the Division's findings of fact. 
2. Whether Petitioner established that the Division committed an error in its 
proceedings regarding an expunged criminal record. 
3. Whether the Executive Director may consider Petitioner's new evidence and 
arguments. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Division made various findings in its Order (under both the Findings 
of Fact section of the Order and the Conclusions of Law section).1 The Division's 
findings are hereby adopted and summarized as follows: 
a. Petitioner was initially licensed to practice as a pharmacist in the 
State of Utah on March 13, 1981, and his controlled substances 
license was issued on August 2, 1983.2 
b. Pursuant to a disciplinary7 action in Case No. OPL-88-79, 
Petitioner's license to dispense controlled substances was 
immediately suspended on October 27, 1988 pending a further 
order by the Division. On January 31, 1989, Petitioner's licenses 
to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances 
were suspended for six months. Three months of the suspension 
was applied retroactively, the remaining three-month suspension 
was stayed in favor of a five-year probationary period and 
Petitioner's licenses were subject to certain terms and conditions. 
c. By Order dated February 10, 1992, some restrictions of the 1989 
Order were terminated, additional probationary conditions were 
imposed, and Petitioner's Licenses were reinstated to full 
privileges on March 23, 1994. 
d. In June and July 2001, while employed by K-Mart and while 
designated as the pharmacist-in-charge, Petitioner remained in the 
pharmacy throughout the night after one of his regular shifts to 
conduct controlled substance audits. Petitioner conducted no 
audits, however. 
e. On August 19, 200L K-Mart terminated Petitioner's employment 
for violations of company policy. An audit on August 21, 2001 by 
K-Mart resulted in the filing of theft and loss reports with the Drug 
Enforcement Agency ("DEA"'), reporting various missing 
medications and controlled substances. There was insufficient 
evidence to find that Petitioner unlawfully possessed or used any of 
these missing controlled substances. 
]Those findings in the Division's Order that are within the Conclusions of Law section are identified 
below. 
2Petitioners license to practice as a pharmacist and his controlled substances license are sometimes 
collectively referred herein as "Petitioners Licenses." 
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f. Petitioner became employed by Dan's Pharmacy in October 2003. 
After completing an evening shift on October 22, 2003, Petitioner 
remained at the pharmacy until the next morning when he was 
discovered by his supervisor, sitting in the back office with a fan 
blowing on him. Dan's Pharmacy conducted a controlled 
substance audit on October 23, 2003, subsequently filed a theft and 
loss report of Alprazolam, Phentermine, and Methylphenidate with 
the DEA, and suspended Petitioner's employment. 
g. Petitioner's urine drug test conducted on October 24, 2003 
revealed the presence of amphetamines for which he had no lawful 
prescription. Petitioner's employment at Dan's Pharmacy was 
terminated on October 30, 2003. 
h. Petitioner used controlled substances from Dan's Pharmacy wrhich 
were not prescribed for him, and such use was to the extent that it 
may have rendered him unsafe to practice pharmacy. (Conclusions 
of Law, p. 8). 
"i. Petitioner acknowledged that he is an addict and some counseling 
would be beneficial to him. (Conclusions of Law, p.7). 
j . Petitioner has resumed his controlled substance abuse and again 
requires intensive treatment. (Conclusions of Law, p. 10). 
k. Petitioner's access to controlled substances enabled his relapse of 
unauthorized controlled substance use. (Conclusions of Law, p. 9). 
2. On August 17, 2004, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action against 
Petitioner's licenses. The Notice incorporated a Petition with four counts of misconduct, 
including the failure to maintain good moral character, unlawfully obtaining/using 
controlled substances, substance abuse to the extent it may have rendered Petitioner 
unsafe to practice pharmacy, and gross negligence. 
3. A hearing was held before the Division and the State Board of Pharmacy 
on February 28 and March 1, 2006. 
4. On May 24, 2006, the Division revoked Petitioner's Licenses. 
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5. Petitioner filed a request for agency review on June 22, 2006. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The standards for agency review correspond to those established by the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-16(4). Utah 
Admin. Code R151-46b-12(7). 
2. The Division may revoke, suspend or otherwise sanction the license of 
any licensee who engages in unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or rule under 
Title 58 of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-401(2)(a). Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-
501(2) defines unprofessional conduct to include: 
(a) violating .. .any statute, rule, or order regulating an occupation or 
profession under this title; 
(e) engaging in conduct, including the use of intoxicants, drugs, narcotics 
or similar chemicals, to the extent that the conduct does or might 
reasonably be considered to, impair the ability of the licensee...to safely 
engage in the occupation or profession... 
It is unlawful for a person to knowingly and intentionally possess or use acontrolled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription from a practitioner. Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
3. Subsequent to a hearing on the allegations in the Petition, the Division 
and the licensing Board dismissed Counts I (Failure to Maintain Good Moral Character) 
and IV (Gross Negligence). They concluded that Petitioner engaged in unprofessional 
conduct when he obtained and used controlled substances from Dan's Pharmacy that 
were not prescribed for him (Count 11) and when he abused controlled substances to the 
extent that it may have rendered him unsafe to practice pharmacy (Count III). 
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4. A person requesting agency review has the burden to specifically state 
the basis for review. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12; Utah Admin. Code § R151-46b-
12(1). He further has the burden of establishing that the Division has committed an 
error in its proceedings based upon the applicable law and the facts of his case, and he 
must set forth any factual or legal basis in support of that request, including adequate 
supporting arguments and citation to the hearing record and to appropriate legal 
authority. See Sections R151-46b-12(3)(b), Rl 51-46b-12(7), and 63-46b-16(4). 
5. Petitioner makes numerous arguments on agency review, including the 
following: 
a. that the amphetamines found in his system resulted from an herbal 
weight loss pill from Brazil named Emigrace; 
b. that during the proceedings, references to his prior criminal record 
which had been expunged were illegal and deprived him of a fair 
hearing; 
c. that the Division's counsel incorrectly stated that Petitioner's 
urinalysis revealed methamphetamines when it was actually 
amphetamines; 
d. that David Davis's testimony should be stricken, because he was 
not an expert on drugs; 
e. that certain of Petitioner's exhibits were wrongfully excluded from 
the record; 
f. regarding Petitioner's employment at K-Mart. that witness Rob 
Vagstad lied about Petitioner being assigned as the pharmacist in 
charge and about the correct date of his termination, and that other 
employees falsified a DEA form; 
g. that the Division's action against him was in retaliation for a 
complaint that Petitioner had made to the Governor's office on 
another matter; and 
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h. that the Division's proceedings were not completed in a timely 
manner. 
Petitioner requests an investigation and sanctions based upon the mention of his 
expunged criminal record during the Division's proceedings. 
A. The Division's Findings 
6. The party challenging an agency's findings of fact must show that the 
finding is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g). uAn appellant must first marshal all the evidence in 
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." 
Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 216, \ 6, 138 P.3d 63, citations omitted; Utah Admin. 
Code R151-46b-12(3)(c). The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the Executive 
Director to accept the findings of fact made by the Division as conclusive. Utah Admin. 
Code R151-46b-12(3)(c); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
7. Petitioner appears to challenge the Division's findings that he obtained 
and used controlled substances from Dan's Pharmacy when he did not have a proper 
prescription from a practitioner for such substances, that he abused those substances to 
the extent that it may have rendered him unsafe to practice pharmacy, and that he is an 
addict who has relapsed into unauthorized use of controlled substances. However, 
Petitioner has failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of these findings and 
has failed to show that despite such evidence, there was substantial evidence in the 
record to the contrary. Petitioner reviews only the evidence that supports his position 
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(for example, that an over-the-counter medication can cause a false positive result in a 
drug test, that a Brazilian diet pill was responsible for the amphetamines in his system, 
that he was not the pharmacist-in-charge at K-Mart, and that K-Mart employees forged 
certain DEA forms), and he leaves it to the Executive Director to sort out what evidence 
actually supported the Division's findings. Not only does this method fail to meet the 
marshaling requirement, but Petitioner essentially asks the Executive Director to 
reconsider the validity of the evidence and asks her to substitute her judgment for that of 
the Division on contested factual issues. 
8. The Executive Director will accept the Division's findings of fact as 
conclusive due to Petitioner's failure to marshal the evidence,3 and she declines to 
substitute her judgment for that of the Division and the licensing Board. See Sweet at |^ 
7, citing Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ^  28, 80 P.3d 553 (in which the Court of 
Appeals declined to substitute its judgment for that of the District Court). Where there 
is competing evidence, it is the province of the Division and the Board, not the 
Executive Director, to resolve conflicting evidence. Where inconsistent inferences can 
be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Division and the Board to draw the 
inferences, even if the Executive Director may have come to a different conclusion. 
Carter v. Labor Comm 'n Appeals Board, 2006 UT App 477, ^ j 17, 566 Utah Adv. Rep. 
27, citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.23 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
See also, State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, ^  16, 51 P.3d 21 (holding that a jury is 
entitled to use its own judgment on what evidence to believe and may draw reasonable 
inferences from that evidence). 
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9. For the purposes of agency review, the facts that were critical in 
upholding Counts II and III were supported by substantial evidence that was largely 
based upon Petitioner's admissions, which was essentially that he had resumed 
amphetamine abuse. Although Petitioner marshals only his testimony that he has not 
illegally used amphetamines since the 1989 disciplinary action, there is substantial 
testimony that he resumed his amphetamine abuse. Petitioner admitted that he had an 
addiction to amphetamines. Hearing Transcript, 491:8-14; 515:1-22. Because of his 
problems, before beginning his employment with K-Mart, Petitioner asked for a part-
time schedule and that a pharmacy technician work with him at all times. Hearing 
Transcript, 417:1-25; 418:1-25; 502:22-25; 503:1-14. Petitioner does not crave and 
does not use them [amphetamines] all the time, but he does crave and does use them 
sometimes. Hearing Transcript, 515:5-25. He has learned to exercise to deal with his 
problem, but if he has to give up exercise, then he starts slipping back. Hearing 
Transcript, 521:18-22. After drug treatment around 1988, and after a year or two in 
Alcoholics Anonymous, Petitioner fell into old habits. Hearing Transcript 524:7-25. 
When his work hours increased and he had to quit walking. Petitioner "probably took a 
few things [he] shouldn't have." Hearing Transcript. 522:4-25; 523:1-7. Finally. 
Petitioner admitted that he probably could use an evaluation and some counseling. 
Hearing Transcript, 514:22-25; 515:12-14; 516:2-8; 525:4-23. Thus, there was 
substantial evidence to support the finding that Petitioner is again abusing 
amphetamines. 
' Subsection R15l-46b-12(3)(c), Campbell, at 808 
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10. In addition, Petitioner admitted that he spent the night at Dan's Pharmacy 
on October 22, 2003, and that it is not normal and not a good idea to do so. Hearing 
Transcript, 486:1-15. There was substantial evidence presented that Petitioner had a fan 
blowing on him the next morning and looked unwell, that three types of controlled 
substances were missing from Dan's after Petitioner spent the night there, and that 
Petitioner subsequently tested positive for amphetamines. Although Petitioner denied 
that he took the missing medications, that his positive drug test resulted from the 
missing medications and that he was abusing medications while spending the night at 
Dan's, the Division and the Board considered his credibility and compared his 
testimony against that of the other witnesses, against the documentary evidence, and 
against his own admissions and inconsistent statements. The Division and the Board 
were entitled to draw reasonable inferences from all the evidence to conclude that 
Petitioner took the missing medications from Dan's pharmacy and as a result, tested 
positive for amphetamines. Waldron, *j] 16. 
11. During the Division hearing, for example, Petitioner attempted to explain 
the amphetamine results on his drug test as over-the-counter diet pills or a Vicks 
inhaler. Through Dr. Poulsen, he offered the explanation that over-the-counter diet 
pills, such as Fen Phen from Brazil, result in false positives for amphetamines. Hearing 
Transcript, 287:6-24. However, Dr. Poulsen stated that his testimony was based upon 
what his patients have told him about false positives and not on any independent drug 
testing. Hearing Transcript. 288:19-25; 289:1. In addition, Dr. Poulsen had no training 
in toxicology. Hearing Transcript, 290:8-10. The Division and the Board were entitled 
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to consider the weight of Dr. Poulsen's testimony against that of David Davis, who 
testified about the drug testing procedures used by Dan's Pharmacy, which included a 
two-step process designed to weed out false positive results from over-the-counter 
medications. Hearing Transcript, 117:1-5; 118:1-25; 141:4-7: 145:14-19. 
12. Petitioner has failed to establish that the Administrative Law Judge 
("ALJ") who conducted the hearing erred in admitting the testimony of David Davis. 
Petitioner argues that Mr. Davis was not a physician and not an expert on drugs, that he 
should not have been permitted to testily as to whether the missing drugs from Dan's 
Pharmacy could yield a positive amphetamine drug test. (Petitioner's Reply 
Memorandum, pp. 2-3). However, the record indicates that Davis was not offered as an 
expert on drugs. Rather, he was called to testify regarding his knowledge in human 
resources and the drug testing policies and procedures used at Dan's Pharmacy, as well 
as providing a foundation for the drug test given to Petitioner. The ALJ overruled 
Petitioner's objection on that basis.4 Hearing Transcript, 131:14-21. Petitioner failed to 
establish that Davis did not have the knowledge to testify regarding the drug testing 
policies and procedures, and his testimony was properly admitted. Mr. Davis properly 
testified about the two-step screening process used at Dan's Pharmacy. Hearing 
Transcript, 116:21-25; pp. 117-120. 
13. It is not necessary to address Petitioner's claims regarding the evidence 
admitted with regard to Petitioner's work at K-Mart, including Petitioner's concerns 
4In fact, it was Petitioner who asked Davis as to whether certain medications could yield a positive result 
for amphetamines, even though he had previously objected to Davis providing such expert testimony. 
Hearing Transcript, 132:6-7. 
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regarding Robert Vagstad's testimony (that Petitioner was the pharmacist-in-charge; the 
date of his termination at K-Mart) and Petitioner's allegations that K-Mart employees 
forged a DEA form. The Executive Director has accepted the Division's findings as 
conclusive due to Petitioner's failure to properly marshal the evidence. Moreover, even 
though the Division found that Petitioner was the pharmacist-in-charge at K-Mart, such 
finding was not necessary to the ultimate conclusion to uphold Counts II and III of the 
petition. It was the evidence submitted with respect to Petitioner's employment at 
Dan's pharmacy (spending the night there, missing medications, positive amphetamine 
drug test) and Petitioner's prior disciplinary record that caused the Division and the 
Board to uphold Counts II and III in the Petition? 
B. Expunged Record 
14. The Executive Director applies the correction-of-error standard when 
reviewing the Division's interpretation of general questions of law, granting no 
deference to the Division's decisions. Associated Gen. Contrs. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 2001 UT 
112,1 18.38P.3d291. 
15. Petitioner claims that the Division Investigator illegally referred to his 
expunged criminal record, and argues that the Board members were so affected by this 
reference that he did not receive a fair hearing. He also asks for an investigation and 
"It is also not necessary to delve into Petitioner's claims that the Division's counsel wrongfully referred to 
the drug test result as positive for methamphetamines. The record clearly indicates that the test yielded a 
positive result for amphetamines. Counsel's reference to methamphetamines was harmless error that did 




16. "'Expungement* means the sealing or destruction of a criminal record, 
including records of the investigation, arrest, detention, or conviction of the petitioner." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(5). When one's criminal record has been expunged and the 
person properly serves an administrative agency with notice of the expungement, the 
agency may not divulge information contained in the expunged portion of the criminal 
record. Utah Code Ann.. §§ 77-18-14(2) and (5). However, due to its responsibility to 
protect the public, the Division may receive information regarding expunged records 
from the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Division within the 
Department of Public Safety. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-15(2); JJ.W. v. State, 2001 UT 
App271,123,33P.3d59. 
17. Contrary to Petitioner's arguments, the ALJ did not admit any 
information from the expunged record into evidence. The issue of the expunged record 
was first raised when the Division Investigator was asked why the Division filed a 
disciplinary action against Petitioner in 1989. Hearing Transcript, 168:12-22. The 
Investigator said that Petitioner had a criminal record that was expunged. Id Petitioner 
promptly stated that he did not want that information to come into the record, at which 
point the ALJ considered Petitioner's objections and notified the parties that he would 
review the prior disciplinary orders in camera as well as the expungement laws and then 
would rule on whether the information from the expunged record was admissible. 
Hearing Transcript. 186:10-22: 187:7-12. In the meantime, the ALJ advised the parties 
and the Board that there would be no further questions regarding the expunged record. 
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Hearing Transcript, 199:5-25; 200:1-25; 201:1-2. At the beginning of the second day, 
the ALJ upheld Petitioner's objection, and notified the parties and the Board that they 
were not to speculate or concern themselves with any information regarding the 
expunged record. Hearing Transcript, 262:4-25. The ALJ restated this ruling again 
when Board members indicated their confusion over the admissibility of the expunged 
record. Hearing Transcript, 398:24-25; 399:1-19; 491:18-25. 
18. Petitioner claims that the mere mention of the expunged record was 
illegal. Petitioner's Reply Memorandum, p. 4. The expungement statute prohibits an 
agency from disclosing information in an expunged record. Subsection 77-18-14(5). 
Here, the Investigator did not provide any information regarding the criminal record that 
was expunged. In addition, any mention of the expunged record during the Division 
hearing was harmless error, because there is no reasonable likelihood that any such error 
affected the outcome of the case. Morton Int'l at 584. The Division's Order indicates 
that the expunged criminal record was not the basis for the findings and conclusions 
supporting the Division's decision to revoke Petitioner's license. The Division's Order 
contains no mention of the expunged record or any criminal conduct that resulted in the 
prior disciplinary action against Petitioner.6 In the contrary, the Order indicates that 
Petitioner has an amphetamine abuse problem (based upon his admissions), and that 
Petitioner had a prior disciplinary record. Thus, any reference to the expunged criminal 
record was harmless. 
Because it is not clear from the record whether Subsection 77-18-15(2)(d) was considered below, these 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Review will not address whether the Divisioncould 
consider Petitioner's expunged record in light of its authority under Subsection 77-18-15(2)(d) to receive 
information from expunged records. 
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19. Finally, although Petitioner asks for sanctions and an investigation, he 
has failed to show that the Executive Director has any authority under the expungement 
laws to initiate such an investigation or to issue any sanctions. 
C. New Evidence, New Arguments, Lack of Briefing 
20. Petitioner raises new evidence and arguments upon agency review that 
cannot be considered by the Executive Director. He argues that the Brazilian diet drug 
"Emigrace'* caused the positive result for amphetamines, and he refers to media 
coverage regarding Emigrace. Petitioner's Memorandum August 24, 2006, p. 2. 
Petitioner also submitted with his reply memorandum a July 7, 2004 letter from him to 
someone at the Governor's Office (presumably in support of his argument that the 
Division's action against him was retaliatory in nature). This new evidence and 
accompanying arguments are hereby stricken as not part of the Division's record and not 
properly preserved for agency review. 
21. The Executive Director applies the same standards for agency review as 
those used for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Admin. Code 
R151 -46b-12(7). "The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced../'1 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the record on appeal may be supplemented only ''because of an omission or 
exclusion, or a dispute as to the accuracy of reporting, and not to introduce new 
material into the recordr State v Law, 2003 UT App 228. H 2. 75 P.3d 923. citing 
Olson v Park-Craig-Olson, Inc . 815 P.2d 1356. 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis 
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added). Petitioner does not claim that there was any error in reporting what occurred in 
the Division's proceeding. Although Petitioner introduced at the hearing his theory that 
over-the-counter diet pills could provide false positives for amphetamines, he did not 
identify Emigrace as such a diet pill, nor did he introduce any evidence that he had 
actually taken Emigrace. It is improper for Petitioner to now attempt to supplement the 
record. 
22. In addition, by failing to raise various arguments during the Division's 
proceedings and failing to properly brief these arguments, Petitioner failed to properly 
preserve those arguments for agency review. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 
844, 847 (Utah 1998) (failure to preserve); Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 
1J52, citing Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, f74, 73 P.3d 334 (holding that 
issues not adequately briefed need not be addressed). These arguments include' 
Petitioner's allegations that the current action by the Division is retaliatory in nature, 
that certain of his exhibits were wrongfully excluded from the record, that the 
Division's proceedings were not completed on a timely basis, and that there was board 
member bias. 
D. Summary 
23. In summary. Petitioner failed to properly marshal the evidence in support 
of the Division's findings. Therefore, the Executive Director accepts the Division's 
findings as conclusive. Based on Petitioner's admissions alone, there was substantial 
evidence to support the critical facts that support Counts II and III of the petition. Even 
if the Executive Director would have reached a different conclusion after evaluating the 
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conflicting evidence, she will not substitute her judgment for that of the Division and 
the Board. Petitioner has also failed to establish that there was any error with regard to 
an expunged record. Finally, the Executive Director declines to consider various 
arguments made by Petitioner, which he failed to raise during the Division's 
proceedings, failed to properly preserve, and failed to properly brief. 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
For the foregoing reasons, the Division's decision revoking Randy T. Tippets' 
licenses to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances is hereby 
affirmed. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review 
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition 
for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16, 
Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust 
administrative remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeons v.. 
Department of Commerce, et ai: 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after 
the date of this Order pursuant to Section 63-46b-13. 
Dated t h i s ' ^ t ^ ~day of February. 2007. 
Francine A. Giani. Executive Director 
Utah Department of Commerce 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on t h e ^ jday of February, 2007, the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
Review by first class and certified mail to: 
Randy T. Tippets 
5123 South 550 West 
Ogden, UT 84405 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
F. David Stanley, Director 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Karl Perry, Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South - Box 140872 





BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
RANDY VJ. TIPPETS 
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST 
AND TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
O R D E R 
Case No. DOPL-2004-183 
The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Presiding Officer of 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the 
State of Utah. Respondent's licenses to practice as a pharmacist 
and to dispense controlled substances are thus revoked, effective 
the date of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revoked licenses, both wall 
and wallet sizes, as well as any embossed certificate, thus be 
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
rf day. of May, 2006 Dated th-^ s A, 
Daniel T. Jon£% 
Presiding Officer 
'Agency review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
request for agency review with the Executive Director, Department 
of Commerce, -..'ithin thirty (30) days after the date of this 
Order. The laws and rules governing agency review are found in 
Section 63-46b-12 of the Utah Code, and Section R151-46b-12 of 
the Utah Administrative Code. 
ADDENDUM "D" 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : FINDINGS OF FACT 
RANDY T. TIPPETS : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
AND TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES : 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH : Case No. DOPL-2004-183 
Appearances: 
Karl G. Perry for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Randy T. Tippets for Respondent 
BY THE BOARD: 
A February 28 - March 1, 2006 hearing was conducted in the 
above-entitled proceeding before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative 
Law Judge for the Department of Commerce, and the State Board of 
Pharmacy. Board members present were Betty Yamashita, Shawna 
Hanson, Mark A. Munger, Marty Val Hill, Dominic DeRose, Jr., and 
Edgar Cortes. The remaining Board member (Roger B. Fitzpatrick) 
was absent. 
J. Craig Jackson, Director of the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing, was also absent. However, Mr. 
Jackson had designated Daniel T. Jones (Division Bureau Manager) 
as the substitute presiding officer to review and act upon the 
Board's recommendation in this proceeding. Mr. Jones was thus 
present for the hearing. 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. The Board 
now enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and submits 
the following Recommended Order for review and action by the 
Division: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this 
proceeding has been, licensed to practice as a pharmacist and to 
dispense controlled substances in this state. Respondent was 
initially licensed as a pharmacist on March 13, 1981 and his 
controlled substance license was issued August 2, 1983. 
2. Pursuant to an October 27, 1988 Order (Case No. OPL-88-
79), Respondent's license to dispense controlled substances was 
immediately suspended pending a further order by the Division. 
Pursuant to a January 31, 1989 Order, Respondent's licenses to 
practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances 
were suspended for six (6) months. 
3. Ninety (90) days of that suspension was applied 
retroactively to October 27, 1988. A stay of enforcement was 
entered as to the remaining three (3) months of the suspension 
and Respondent's licenses were placed on probation for five (5) 
years, subject to certain terms and conditions. 
4. Pursuant to a February 10, 1992 Amended Order, certain 
restrictions required by the January 31, 1989 Order were 
terminated and additional probationary conditions were imposed. 
Respondent's licenses to practice as a pharmacist and dispense 
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controlled substances were reinstated to full privileges on March 
23, 1994. 
5. Respondent commenced employment as a pharmacist at the 
K-mart Pharmacy in South Ogden, Utah on or about February 2001. 
Susan Myers was the pharmacist-in-charge.at that time. Based on 
the substantial and credible evidence presented, audits of the 
pharmacy controlled substance inventory were conducted on March 
25, 2001 and in early May 2001. 
6. Based on the substantial and credible evidence 
presented, Respondent was designated as the pharmacist-in-charge 
on or about mid June 2001. He was thus instructed to conduct an 
audit of Schedule II controlled substances within approximately 
ten (10) days and another audit in late July 2001. 
7. Based on the substantial and credible evidence 
presented, Respondent remained in the pharmacy throughout the 
night following one of his regularly assigned shifts in mid or 
late June 2001. Respondent also remained in the pharmacy 
approximately five (5) hours after his shift was scheduled to end 
at 6:00 p.m. on July 8, 2001. There is a lack of sufficient 
evidence Respondent accessed the pharmacy computer as to view any 
pornographic Internet websites either that evening or during the 
morning of July 9, 2001. 
8. Based on the substantial and more credible evidence 
presented, Respondent did not conduct the audits which were to 
have been done in late June and late July 2001. Respondent's 
employment at the K-mart Pharmacy was terminated on or about 
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August 19, 2 0 01 due to violations of company policy, bas-ed on his 
employer's conclusions that Respondent had failed to maintain 
adequate record keeping and that he had engaged in inappropriate 
Internet usage. A controlled substance audit was then conducted 
on August 21, 2001. 
9. Based on that audit, a theft and loss report was filed 
with the Drug Enforcement Administration. That report recites 
losses of medications in the following dosages and quantities: 
Adderall 20mg tablets (406) ; Dexedrine lOmg CR capsules (19) ; 
Dexedrine 15mg CR capsules (260); Dextrostat 5mg tablets {106); 
Methadone 5mg tablets (200); Methadone lOmg tablets (100); 
Hydrocodone/APAP 7.5/500 mg tablets (70); and Hydrocodone/APAP 
5/500mg tablets (223). 
10. The theft and loss report also recites the following 
losses of medications: Lortab 7.5mg tablets (59); Norco lOmg 
tablets (345); Alprazolam 0.25mg tablets (67); Lorazepam 0.5mg 
tablets (103) ; Lorazepam lmg tablets (99) ; Phentermine 3 0mg 
capsules (567); Phentermine 37.5mg capsules (200); Didrex 50mg 
tablets (99); Diazepam 5mg tablets (41); Clonazepam 0.5mg tablets 
(65); and Temazepam 3 0mg capsules (39). There is a lack of 
sufficient and credible evidence to find Respondent unlawfully 
possessed or used any of the above stated controlled substances. 
11. Respondent commenced employment as a pharmacist with 
Associated Retail Stores in mid October 2003. Carrie Farnsworth 
was the pharmacy manager for Dan's Pharmacy where Respondent was 
thus employed. Ms. Farnsworth conducted a controlled substance 
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audit of the pharmacy on October 18, 2003 and that audit revealed 
no discrepancies in the controlled substance inventory. 
12. Ms. Farnsworth was present at the pharmacy on the 
evening of October 22, 2003 to assist Respondent in closing the 
pharmacy. Ms. Farnsworth left the pharmacy shortly before 9:00 
p.m. that evening. She was contacted at home at approximately 
7:00 a.m. on October 23, 2003 when Respondent had not turned in 
the cash till from the pharmacy for the prior evening. 
13. Based on the more substantial and credible evidence 
presented, Ms. Farnsworth arrived at the pharmacy and she found 
Respondent sitting in the back office of the pharmacy with a fan 
blowing on him. Based on the substantial and more credible 
evidence presented, Respondent informed Ms. Farnsworth that he 
was nauseated and he appeared to be irritated and angry. 
Respondent left the pharmacy at approximately 9:30 a.m. that 
morning after his brother-in-law had arrived to provide 
transportation for Respondent. 
14. Respondent's employment with Associated Retail Stores 
was suspended on October 23, 2003, pending a controlled substance 
audit and drug testing. A controlled substance audit was 
conducted at the pharmacy on October 23, 2003. Based on that 
audit, a theft and loss report was filed with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, which recites losses of medications 
in the following doses and quantities: Alprazolam 0.25mg tablets 
(32); Phentermine 37.5mg tablets (8); and Methylphenidate 5mg 
tablets (6). 
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15. Respondent submitted to a urine drug test on October 
24, 2003. Test results revealed the presence of amphetamines. 
Respondent had not been lawfully prescribed any medication by any 
practitioner as to account for the October 24, 2003 test result. 
Respondent's employment with Associated Retail Stores was 
terminated on October 30, 2003 due to his violation of company 
policies. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Division contends Respondent has failed to maintain good 
moral character, which is required for his ongoing licensure as a 
pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances. The Division 
asserts Respondent has obtained and used controlled substances 
which were not prescribed to him by any practitioner and that he 
has abused those substances to the extent that it may have 
rendered him unsafe to practice pharmacy. 
The Division also urges Respondent engaged in grossly 
negligent conduct when he failed to perform requried audits and 
thus failed to maintain records of controlled substances while 
employed at the K-mart Pharmacy. The Division thus urges that 
Respondent's licenses should be revoked for no less than three 
(3) years. Moreover, the Division contends Respondent should be 
required to successfully complete chemical dependency, 
psychological and physical evaluations and a drug treatment 
program before any determination is made whether he might be 
subsequently relicensed. 
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Respondent acknowledges he is an addict and some counseling 
would be beneficial for him. Respondent asserts he obtained drug 
treatment counseling in 1988 and that he attended Alcoholics 
Anonymous and support group meetings relative to that treatment. 
Respondent contends there is no evidence that he has engaged in 
any unprofessional conduct which has caused harm to any pharmacy 
customer and he urges that his licenses should not be revoked. 
Utah Code Ann. §58-1-401(2) provides the Division may 
revoke, suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or 
private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license of any 
licensee who: 
(a) . . . has engaged in unprofessional conduct, 
as defined by statute or rule under this title; 
(d) . . . is unable to practice the 
occupation or profession with reasonable 
skill and safety because of . . . excessive 
use of drugs, narcotics . . . or as a result 
of any other mental or physical condition, 
when the licensee's condition demonstrates a 
threat or potential threat to the public 
health, safety or welfare. 
§58-1-501(2) generally defines unprofessional conduct to 
include: 
(a) violating . . . any statute, rule, or 
order regulating an occupation or profession 
under this title; 
(e) engaging in conduct, including the use 
of intoxicants, drugs, narcotics or similar 
chemicals, to the extent that the conduct 
does or might reasonably be considered to, 
impair the ability of the licensee . . . to 
safely engage in the occupation or 
profession; 
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(g) practicing . . , an occupation or 
profession regulated under this title through 
gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a 
pattern of incompetency or negligence. 
§58-17a-302(1) (f) also provides that a pharmacist must maintain 
satisfactory evidence of good moral character as it relates to 
his ability to practice pharmacy. 
The Board readily finds and concludes Respondent obtained 
and used controlled substances from Dan's Pharmacy which were not 
prescribed for him by any practitioner and he thus engaged in 
unprofessional conduct violative of §58-1-501 (2) (a) . The Board 
also finds and concludes Respondent abused those substances while 
so employed to the extent it may have rendered him unsafe to 
practice pharmacy and he thus engaged in unprofessional conduct 
violative of §58-1-501 (2) (e) . Accordingly, the Board finds and 
concludes a proper factual and legal basis exists to enter a 
disciplinary sanction as to Respondent's licenses. 
The Board has considered the claims made by the Division as 
to whether Respondent's conduct establishes his failure to have 
maintained good moral character. The only assertion in this 
proceeding which possibly bears on Respondent's moral character 
involves his allegedly inappropriate Internet use while employed 
at the K-mart Pharmacy. 
The Board reiterates its finding that there is a lack of 
sufficient and credible evidence that Respondent engaged in any 
such conduct. Accordingly, the Board finds and concludes there 
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is no proper factual basis that Respondent lacks good moral 
character as required of every pharmacist. 
The Board next reiterates its finding that Respondent failed 
to conduct audits as required by his employer at the K-mart 
Pharmacy. Respondent may well have been negligent when he did 
not ensure that the audits in question were conducted. However, 
there is a lack of sufficient and credible evidence that 
Respondent was grossly negligent in that regard. Moreover, there 
is a lack of sufficient and credible evidence that Respondent 
engaged in a pattern of negligent misconduct as to warrant a 
conclusion that he violated §58-1-501(2)(g). 
Respondent has engaged in serious unprofessional conduct. 
Respondent's access to controlled substances enabled his relapse 
of unauthorized controlled substance use. Moreover, Respondent's 
abuse of such controlled substances occurred in.a work setting, 
which prompted his failure to properly leave Dan's Pharmacy on 
the evening of October 22, 2003 when he was no longer authorized 
to remain on the premises. The Board readily rejects 
Respondent's suggestion that he remained in either pharmacy after 
his normal working hours because he was performing work-related 
tasks that had to be completed. 
Respondent knowingly diverted certain controlled substances 
from his employer at Dan's Pharmacy for his unauthorized personal 
use. There is no evidence Respondent's conduct resulted in 
actual harm to any co-worker, pharmacy customer or the general 
public. However, Respondent's diversion of controlled substances 
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and the degree of his impairment due to his unauthorized use of 
those controlled substances clearly created a potential for harm 
to the public. 
There are certain aggravating circumstances which should be 
considered in this case. Respondent has been subject to prior 
disciplinary action. His most recent misconduct reveals a 
pattern of unauthorized drug use. Further, Respondent has 
engaged in multiple offenses which now subjects his licenses to 
disciplinary sanction. 
Significantly, Respondent has resumed his controlled 
substance abuse. Despite Respondent's prior efforts which may 
have allowed him to demonstrate a meaningful and sustained period 
of successful rehabilitation, it is clearly evident Respondent 
again requires intensive treatment with a regimen of counseling 
and support group meetings to effectively address his current 
condition. 
The Board thus finds and concludes no proper basis presently 
exists to allow Respondent to practice as a pharmacist and to 
have any access to controlled substances in that regard. 
Moreover, the Board is convinced Respondent must successfully 
complete a drug treatment program and establish a pattern.of 
diligent attendance at support group meetings before any 
determination might be made whether Respondent could safely 
resume any practice as a pharmacist in this state. 
The Board also finds and concludes that drug treatment 
counseling for Respondent should be preceded by psychological and 
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physical evaluations to meaningfully identify the issues which 
must be addressed. Accordingly, the Board submits the following 
Recommended Order to adequately protect the public and prompt 
Respondent's timely pursuit of rehabilitative treatment as a 
predicate to any subsequent relicensure to practice as a 
pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to practice as 
a pharmacist in this state shall be revoked, effective the date 
this Recommended Order may be adopted by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
It is further ordered that Respondent's license to dispense 
controlled substances shall also be revoked, effective the date 
this Recommended Order may be adopted by the Division. 
On behalf of the State Board of Pharmacy, I hereby certify 
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order were submitted to Daniel T. Jones, Substitute 
Presiding Officer for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, on the *&3r~^— day of May, 2006 for 
his review and action. . 
/J. Steven Eklund 
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